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Coal’s reign in the energy domain may be at its twilight hour,[1] but it still remains to be an important 
mineral: Coal accounted for 23% of U.S. electricity production[2] in 2019 and it also provides the 
primary source of funding for ongoing mine site reclamation. Usually, income from mining operations 
fund reclamation efforts directly as operators pay to restore mined land after extracting permitted coal 
reserves. However, income from operations may also indirectly fund reclamation considering that 
premiums paid on surety performance bonds create the economic incentive for insurance companies 
to guarantee reclamation in the event of a default.[3] As a result of this reclamation system, returning 
mined land back to its original state depends, to some degree, upon the continued success and 
survival of the coal industry.
The recent, widespread insolvency of coal companies has jeopardized reclamation efforts and 
revealed several issues with the current performance bonding system,[4] implemented under the 
Surface Mining Policy, Control and Reclamation Act of 1977[5] (SMCRA) as a means to insure 
reclamation. First, a GAO report found that 22% of a large sample of bond forfeitures contained 
inadequate financial assurances.[6] Second, the SMCRA allows states to accept self-bonds and less 
than full-cost assurances.[7] Third, the SMCRA only allows the Abandoned Mine Land (AML) fund to 
be used to fund reclamation at mines abandoned before 1977 or at mines with insurers that became insolvent before 1990.[8] These issues, in connection 
with the widespread insolvency of coal companies, may result in significant environmental obligations being left behind for state taxpayers to deal with.
Along these same lines, some state taxpayers may ultimately be left with these environmental burdens as it is becoming more apparent that Kentucky and 
West Virginia’s state bond pools, which are designed to deal with excess costs in the event of a default of a surety bond’s obligations, will be unable to 
remain solvent.[9] This blog post suggests that the best solution may include amending Title IV of the SMCRA to allow for the overfunded AML to be used to 
provide liquidity for these anemic state bond pools.[10] Another solution may require that states rely on an exception under Section 409, which allows AML 
funds to be allocated to states when a recently abandoned mine constitutes a “hazardous condition.”[11]
This blog post will first provide an overview of the SMCRA and the current performance bonding system. Then, this blog post will discuss why amending 
Section 402(g) to broaden the availability of AML funds for states with bond pools facing impending insolvency, may be a prime solution for the current 
environmental and industrial issues facing coal producing states.
The Surface Mining Policy, Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA)
The Surface Mining Policy, Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA) created the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMRE) 
and a federal body of law to regulate surface coal mining.[12] The goal of the SMCRA is to “[A]ssure that the coal supply essential to the Nation’s energy 
requirements, and to its economic and social well-being is provided and strike a balance between protection of the environment and agricultural 
productivity and the Nation’s need for coal as an essential source of energy.”[13] The SMCRA executes this goal by operating as a mechanism of 
cooperative federalism.[14] More specifically, the SMCRA formulates standards for obtaining mining permits, requires financial guaranties for completing 
reclamation and outlines a general process for being released from such guaranties post-performance.[15] 
After a tract of land has been mined, the SMCRA generally requires that the mine site be returned to “approximate original contour.”[16] More specifically, 
applicants are required to:
“[R]estore the land affected to a condition capable of supporting the uses which it was capable of supporting prior to any mining, or higher or better 
uses of which there is reasonable likelihood, so long as such use or uses do not present any actual or probable hazard to public health or safety or 
pose any actual or probable threat of water diminution or pollution….”[17]
The broad language regarding the ability of the land to support “better uses” and the “reasonable likelihood” of such uses not presenting a public health 
issue may leave much discretion to regulators in determining when a reclamation plan’s obligations have been satisfied.[18] 
Financial Assurances
In order to insure that reclamation will be completed, SMCRA requires that applicants seeking mining permits submit financial assurances in the form of 
performance bonds.[19] These financial assurance may be inadequate sometimes due to, amongst other reasons, the fact that some state programs allow 
guaranties for less than the total cost of reclamation.[20] To boot, the SMCRA specifically allows states to accept assurances for less than the total cost.[21] 
The rationale behind this may be that states want to lower bonding costs and premiums in order to attract industry and relieve operators of some of the 
financial burdens that environmental obligations entail. As a corollary, lower bonding costs may be necessary for sustaining the long-term reclamation 
efforts and survival of the coal industry. However, the repercussions of this system is that abandoned mines sometimes leave forfeited bonds with insufficient 
funds to cover reclamation costs, and this may be detrimental to the public health.[22]
States like Kentucky and West Virginia have responded to these issues by implementing bond pools that cover excess costs provided that the operator paid 
into a state fund a fixed fee on each ton of coal produced.[23] However, these systems inherently depend upon the continued survival and success of the 
coal industry.[24] The recent widespread downturn has created systemic risks of insolvency for these bond pools as more cash is now being paid out than is 
coming in.[25]
Amending Title IV of the SMCRA or Broadly Interpreting Section 409
It is becoming clearer that a solution to the funding problem is needed as pooled state reclamation funds are beginning to crumble under the widespread 
forfeiture of performance bonds.[26] One solution may consist of using AML funds to reinsure the rapidly dissolving liquidity of state bond pools.[27] By 
doing this, insurers and landowners may also be provided with more confidence that environmental liabilities will not rest solely upon their shoulders. This in 
turn may lower costs on some coal producers and facilitate more assignments of mineral leases.
However, the problem with this approach is that the SMCRA reserves AML funds only for those mines abandoned before 1977, or those mines with insurers 
that became insolvent before 1990.[28] However, as time goes on, the number of mines that fit this criteria may be shrinking considering AML funds 
continue to trickle in while states reconcile problems on these older mine sites.[29] This may help explain why a great deal of AML funds currently remain 
unappropriated.[30] All the while, a potential disaster is looming amongst the largest coal-producing states in regard to recently abandoned mines.
If states become more confident that the AML will be used to reinsure state bond pools, then they may be able to provide insurers and landowners, whom 
may for example fear liability under CERCLA, with more confidence regarding potential environmental liabilities. Such confidence may then lead to lower 
bonding and transaction costs while at the same time aiding environmental reclamation efforts.[31] Whatever the case may be, putting the burden of funding 
reclamation of recently abandoned mines on collapsing state funds or on current operators, by levying a higher fixed fee per ton, may not be the right 
answer. After all, the AML itself was funded by operators paying in a fixed fee on each ton of coal produced. Also, the AML is intended to be used to 
reclaim abandoned mines.[32] The only thing that separates it from the problems some states currently face is the timeliness of the abandonment.[33] 
Therefore, expanding the availability of AML funds appears to be the prime candidate for resolving these environmental and industrial issues that coal-
country is currently faced with.
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